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I
2018 was a glorious year for scholars who, like myself, have long been advocates of
the direct horizontal eﬀect of (EU) fundamental rights. In four judgments –
Egenberger,1IR v JQ,2 Bauer,3 and Max Planck4 – the European Court of
Justice deﬁnitively established the direct eﬀect of Article 21, Article 31(2), and
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter: The
Charter) in the adjudication of litigations between private parties.
The present paper is a commentary on Egenberger and IR v JQ. Both cases deal
with the religion-based discrimination of (potential) employees by a church-based
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2ECJ 11 September 2018, Case C-68/17, IR v JQ.
3ECJ 6 November 2018, Joined Cases C-569/16 and C-570/16, Stadt Wuppertal and Volker
Willmeroth als Inhaber der TWI Technische Wartung und Instandsetzung Volker Willmeroth e.K. v
Maria Elisabeth Bauer and Martina Broßonn. For a comment on this judgment see, in this issue,
the case note on Bauer et al., E. Frantziou, ‘(Most of ) The Charter of Fundamental Rights Is
Horizontally Applicable’, 15 EuConst (2019) p. 306.
4ECJ 6 November 2018, Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der
Wissenschaften e.V. v Tetsuji Shimizu.
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employer. And, ironically, both cases come from Germany, where the legal culture
over the last 40 years has been quite hostile towards the direct horizontal eﬀect of
fundamental rights.5
T    
In the ﬁrst case, a job applicant –MsVera Egenberger – had allegedly been discrimi-
nated against because she did not belong to any religious denomination. The
employer, Evangelisches Werk, had explicitly stated in the job advertisement that
membership in a Protestant church or a church aﬃliated with the Working Group
of Christian Churches in Germany was required, even though the job in question
arguably had very little to do with churches. Ironically, the position mainly consisted
ofwriting reportsonGermaneﬀorts tocombatdiscrimination inthe frameworkof the
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
The second case concerned a conﬂict between JQ, a physician, and his employer,
IR, a private organisation dependent on the Catholic Church. JQ was divorced; he
subsequently remarried in a civil ceremonywithouthavinghisﬁrst (Catholic)marriage
annulled by a church tribunal. IR, therefore, terminated the employment contract.
In both cases, an employee was claiming that the employer’s actions were not
compatible with the prohibition of discrimination in the German General Law on
Equal Treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) as interpreted in accor-
dance with EU law. And, in both cases, German labour courts had already (partly)
decided in favour of the employee at the phase of litigation preceding the refer-
ence for a preliminary ruling.
For Ms Egenberger, although the labour court of ﬁrst instance had held that
she was a victim of discrimination, it ordered that compensation of no more than
€1957.73 be paid. Ms Egenberger’s further appeals were mainly motivated by her
wish to be awarded a considerably greater amount. The German Federal Labour
Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) referred the case to the European Court of Justice,
since it considered that the outcome of the dispute in the main proceedings
depended on whether the fact that the employer had made a diﬀerentiation based
on church membership was lawful under the German General Law on Equal
Treatment, which had to be interpreted in conformity with EU law.
JQ’s litigation against IR had gone on for nine years before the Court of Justice
passed judgment. The discrimination alleged by JQ and conﬁrmed by the labour
courts was, paradoxically, based on the fact that JQ adhered to the same faith as
his employer. Indeed, JQ was dismissed because he, a Roman Catholic, had
remarried in a civil union without annulling his Catholic marriage beforehand
before a church tribunal. This would not have happened to an employee who
5See text between n. 31 and n. 41 below.
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was, for instance, Protestant or religiously unaﬃliated. Thus, JQ alleged and the
labour courts acknowledged that discrimination had taken place, arguing that IR
would not have dismissed a non-Roman Catholic employee occupying the same
post as JQ in the event he or she remarried.
JQ’s dismissal was deemed unlawful by each labour court involved, including
the German Federal Labour Court. In a last-ditch attempt to prevail, IR ﬁled a
constitutional complaint with the German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht). The complaint was successful: the Constitutional
Court annulled the judgment of the Federal Labour Court because it had not
suﬃciently taken into account the special position of churches under German
constitutional law. The Federal Labour Court had to issue a new judgment on
the same litigation. At this point, the Federal Labour Court – expressing doubts
about the EU law-compatibility of the Constitutional Court’s broad interpretation
of the churches’ freedoms – referred the case to the European Court of Justice.
T    :    EU -
     ‘-’ 
G 
In both Egenberger and IR v JQ, the root of the problem was the extremely
‘church-friendly’ exemptions allowed by the German legislator in the implemen-
tation of Directive 2000/78. Certain exemptions are, in fact, allowed by Article
4(2) of this Directive, according to which:
: : : in the case of occupational activities within churches and other public or pri-
vate organisations the ethos of which is based on religion or belief, a diﬀerence of
treatment based on a person’s religion or belief shall not constitute discrimination
where, by reason of the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are
carried out, a person’s religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justiﬁed
occupational requirement, having regard to the organisation’s ethos. This diﬀerence
of treatment shall be implemented taking account of Member States’ constitu-
tional provisions and principles, as well as the general principles of Community
law, and should not justify discrimination on another ground.6
The German legislator went very far in allowing exemptions for church-based
employers. Paragraph 9 of the General Law on Equal Treatment, which imple-
ments Article 4(2) of the Directive, states in its ﬁrst subparagraph (the stipulation
relevant to the Egenberger dispute) that:
: : : a diﬀerence of treatment on grounds of religion or belief in connection with
employment by religious societies, institutions aﬃliated to them regardless of their
6Emphasis added.
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legal form, or associations which devote themselves to the communal nurture of a
religion or belief shall also be permitted if a particular religion or belief constitutes
a justiﬁed occupational requirement, having regard to the self-perception of the reli-
gious society or association concerned, in view of its right of self-determination or be-
cause of the type of activity.7
Also, the second subparagraph of Paragraph 9 of the General Law on Equal
Treatment (the stipulation relevant to the IR v JQ dispute) focuses on the
self-perception of religious communities. It states:
The prohibition of a diﬀerence of treatment on grounds of religion or belief shall
not aﬀect the right of the religious communities ( : : : ), institutions aﬃliated to
them, regardless of their legal form, or associations that devote themselves to
the communal nurture of a religion or belief, to require their employees to act
in good faith and with loyalty in accordance with their self-perception.8
There is a subtle yet very powerful shift in perspective between the wording of
Article 4(2) of the Directive and Paragraph 9 of the General Law on Equal
Treatment. The Directive sets an objective limit to the justiﬁcation of a diﬀerence
in treatment based on religion or belief: a person’s religion or belief must objectively
constitute a genuine, legitimate and justiﬁed occupational requirement, by reason of
the nature of these activities or of the context in which they are carried out, having
regard to the organisation’s ethos. The perspective is that of an independent observer.
On the contrary, thewording of Paragraph 9 of theGeneral LawonEqualTreatment
adopts a subjective perspective. It allows to answer the questions of whether a given
religion or belief constitutes a justiﬁed occupational requirement, and whether an
employee acts in good faith and with loyalty, by focusing on the ‘self-perception’
of the religious organisation itself, given its right of self-determination. This means,
in practice, that a religious organisation itself may to a large extent authoritatively
determine whether a diﬀerence in treatment based on religion or belief made by
an entity aﬃliated with that organisation is justiﬁed. This makes it very diﬃcult
for German courts to review the lawfulness of acts of religious organisations when
those acts discriminate workers based on their religion or beliefs.9
7Emphasis added.
8Emphasis added.
9The German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) limits judicial review in
such cases to an assessment of the plausibility of the determination by the religious organisation of
whether the activities in question are connected to its ethos in a way that religious aﬃliation is
required of the employee. See the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision in the IR v JQ case: BVerfG
22 October 2014, 2 BvR 661/12, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:rs20141022.2bvr066112. With regard
to Egenberger see B. Göpfert, ‘EuGH entscheidet maßgeblich zum Kirchenarbeitsrecht
(‘Egenberger’)’, Arbeitsrecht. Weltweit, 17 April 2018, 〈www.arbeitsrecht-weltweit.de/2018/04/
17/eugh-entscheidet-massgeblich-zum-kirchenarbeitsrecht-egenberger/〉, visited 1 May 2019.
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The questions referred to the Court of Justice in both Egenberger and IR v JQ
ask ﬁrst and foremost whether Article 4(2) of the Directive is compatible with the
aforementioned subjective perspective, and if not, how that article should be
interpreted.
T  :       
   
In both cases, the Court of Justice clearly rejected the subjective perspective
defended by both the religious organisations and the German government, requiring
that Article 4(2) be interpreted from an objective perspective. And in both cases, the
Court gave very wise answers which assigned national courts the task of determining
the delicate balance between worker protection and discrimination based on religion
or belief on the one hand, and the autonomy of religious organisations on the other.
In Egenberger, the Court ﬁrst explained that Article 4(2) sets out the criteria
that must be taken into account in the balancing exercise performed when two
competing fundamental rights are in play: in this case, the fundamental right of
workers not to be discriminated against and the right of autonomy of organisa-
tions whose ethos is based on religion or belief. In the event of a dispute, ‘it must
be possible for the balancing exercise to be subject if need be of review by an
independent authority, and ultimately by a national court’.10
The Court of Justice reached this result, inter alia, by interpreting Article 4(2)
of the Directive in the light of Article 47 of the Charter. The Court clariﬁed that it
must be possible for an assertion of an organisation whose ethos is based on reli-
gion or belief to be the subject of ‘eﬀective judicial review by which it can be
ensured that the criteria set out in Article 4(2) of that directive are satisﬁed in
the particular case’.11
In Egenberger, the Court explicitly required that an objective perspective be
adopted for the interpretation of Article 4(2) of the Directive. First, this provision
‘must be interpreted as meaning that the genuine, legitimate and justiﬁed
occupational requirement it refers to is a requirement that is necessary and
objectively dictated ( : : : )’. Second, the occupational requirement must comply
with the principle of proportionality.12
See also L. Lourenço, ‘Religion, discrimination and the EU general principles’ gospel: Egenberger’, 56
Common Market Law Review (2019) p. 193 at p. 195.
10Egenberger, paras. 52-53.
11Ibid., para. 59.
12Ibid., para. 69.On this proportionality requirement, seeR.McCrea, ‘Salvation outside the church?
The ECJ rules on religious discrimination in employment’, EULawAnalysis, 18 April 2018, available at
〈eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/09/religious-discrimination-at-work-can.html〉, visited 29 April
2019. See also Lourenço, supra n. 9, p. 199.
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Likewise, in IR v JQ, the Court rejected the subjective perspective defended by
IR and the German government and required an objective perspective as well as
eﬀective judicial review of the decisions of religious organisations. In IR v JQ, the
Court clearly stated that an organisation whose ethos is based on religion or belief
‘cannot decide to subject its employees performing managerial duties to a require-
ment to act in good faith and with loyalty to that ethos that diﬀers according to
the faith or lack of faith of such employees, without that decision being subject,
where appropriate, to eﬀective judicial review to ensure that it fulﬁls the criteria
laid down in Article 4(2)’ of the Directive.13
The abovementioned principles stated by the Court in Egenberger and IR v JQ
entail that Paragraphs 9(1) and (2) of the General Law on equal treatment are not,
as such, incompatible with EU law. However, national courts have to interpret
and apply them in conformity with the Directive and strike a fair balance between
competing fundamental rights. The requirements laid down in Article 4(2) of the
Directive, thus, set an objective limit to the freedom of religious organisations, i.e.
eﬀective judicial review of their decisions must be allowed.
The latter point might seem obvious to many readers of this journal, but from
the viewpoint of German law, it was nothing short of a revolution: the Court of
Justice broke the barriers that German law had erected to protect the autonomy of
religious organisations from interference by state powers, including civil courts.
Since the Egenberger and IR v JQ judgments, German civil courts may review not
only the plausibility but also the substance of decisions of religious organisations
when those decisions are alleged to discriminate against workers on the ground of
religion or beliefs.
This, however, is only the ﬁrst revolution that Egenberger and IR v JQ
unleashed in Germany. The second revolution is perhaps even greater in scope,
since it concerns the direct horizontal eﬀect of (EU) fundamental rights.
E, IR  JQ,      
C 
A central question submitted for preliminary ruling in both Egenberger and IR v
JQ asked whether, if Article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78 cannot be interpreted from
the abovementioned subjective perspective, a national court must disapply a pro-
vision of national law by which unequal treatment based on a worker’s religious
aﬃliation can be justiﬁed based on the self-perception of the religious community
in question.
13IR v JQ, para. 61.
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In Egenberger, the Court answered this question in a series of steps. The Court
began by referring to the principle enshrined in its previous case law according to
which the requirement to interpret national law in conformity with EU law
includes an obligation for national courts to change their established case law
if need be. A national court cannot rightly maintain that it is unable to interpret
a provision of national law in conformity with EU law merely because that pro-
vision has consistently been interpreted in a manner incompatible with EU law.14
Then, in considering the hypothetical scenario in which it is not possible for a
national court to interpret the applicable national law in conformity with Article
4(2) of the Directive, the Court of Justice intervened in the debate on the
horizontal eﬀect of EU fundamental rights.15
Interestingly, as far as the direct horizontal eﬀect of the prohibition of discrim-
ination on grounds of religion was concerned, the Court’s position diverged from
the Opinion delivered by Advocate General Tanchev in Egenberger. The Advocate
General had concluded that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of
religion should not create a subjective right capable of being applied horizontally
in situations involving private parties. Instead, according to the Advocate General,
the remedy available to the applicant under EU law was a state liability action
seeking damages from Germany.16
The Court in Egenberger did not follow the Advocate General on this point.
Instead, the Court acknowledged the direct eﬀect of Article 47 of the Charter and
14Egenberger, paras. 71-73 with references to DI.
15On the horizontal eﬀect of fundamental rights and principles in EU laws see inter alia
A. Hartkamp, ‘The Eﬀect of the EC Treaty in Private Law: On Direct and Indirect Horizontal
Eﬀects of Primary Community Law’, 3 European Review of Private Law (2010) p. 527;
E. Spaventa, ‘The Horizontal Application of Fundamental Rights as General Principles of Union Law’,
in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States – Essays in Honour of Alan Dashwood
(Hart Publishing 2011) p. 199; D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Horizontal Application of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights’, 38 European Law Review (2013) p. 479; C. Mak, ‘Uncharte(re)d
Territory: EU Fundamental Rights and National Private Law’, CESCL Working Paper Series
No. 2013-05, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-25; A. Colombi Ciacchi,
‘European Fundamental Rights, Private Law and Judicial Governance’, in H.-W. Micklitz (ed.),
The Constitutionalisation of European Private Law (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 102;
E. Frantziou, ‘The Horizontal Eﬀect of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
EU: Rediscovering the Reasons for Horizontality’, 21 European Law Journal (2015) p. 657;
O. Cherednychenko and N. Reich, ‘The Constitutionalization of European Private Law:
Gateways, Constraints, and Challenges’, 23 European Review of Private Law (2016) p. 797;
E. Frantziou, The Horizontal Eﬀect of Fundamental Rights in the European Union: A Constitutional
Analysis (Oxford University Press 2019).
16Opinion of AG Tanchev in Case C-414/16 Egenberger, ECLI:EU:C:2017:851, para. 119. On
this divergence between the AG’s opinion and the Court’s decision, see Lourenço, supra n. 9,
p. 198-199.
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the direct horizontal eﬀect of Article 21(1) of the Charter.17 The latter principle
was then conﬁrmed by IR v JQ.18
The Court considered Article 21(1) of the Charter ‘suﬃcient in itself to confer
on individuals a right which they may rely on as such in disputes between them in a
ﬁeld covered by EU law’.19 In this regard, it clariﬁed that ‘(a)s regards its manda-
tory eﬀect, Article 21 of the Charter is no diﬀerent, in principle, from the various
provisions of the founding Treaties prohibiting discrimination on various
grounds, even where the discrimination derives from contracts between individ-
uals’.20 Here the Court referred to its previous judgments in cases such as
Defrenne and Angonese. In Defrenne, the Court explicitly stated that the prohibi-
tion of discrimination applied equally to all agreements intended to regulate paid
labour collectively, ‘as well as to contracts between individuals’.21 Furthermore, in
Angonese,22 the private party that the Court considered bound by the Treaty’s
prohibition of discrimination was not a private regulator (such as a labour union)
but a normal, private employer (a bank). Therefore, after Defrenne and Angonese,
it should have been clear that the direct horizontal eﬀect of EU fundamental
rights and freedoms could apply to contracts between individuals.
Hence, from a purely EU law viewpoint, acknowledgement of the direct hori-
zontal eﬀect of Article 21 of the Charter in Egenberger was neither revolutionary
nor surprising. Arguably, there is a logical and continuous line that extends from
van Gend and Loos23 to Egenberger, passing through Walrave,24 Defrenne,25
Angonese,26Mangold,27Kücükdeveci,28 and DI29 along the way. As a result, the
17For a comment on Egenberger from the viewpoint of the horizontal eﬀect doctrines, see
E. Frantziou, ‘Mangold recast? The ECJ’s ﬂirtation with Drittwirkung in Egenberger’, European
Law Blog, 24 April 2018 〈europeanlawblog.eu/2018/04/24/mangold-recast-the-ecjs-ﬂirtation-
with-drittwirkung-in-egenberger/〉, visited 29 April 2019. See also A. Colombi Ciacchi,
‘Egenberger and Comparative Law: A Victory of the Direct Horizontal Eﬀect of Fundamental
Rights’, 5 European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance (2018) p. 207.
18IR v JQ, paras. 64-65 and 69, with reference to Egenberger.
19Egenberger para. 76 (emphasis added), with reference to Association de médiation sociale; IR v
JQ, para. 69 with reference to Egenberger.
20Egenberger, para. 77.
21ECJ 8 April 1976, Case C-43/1975, Defrenne.
22ECJ 6 June 2000, Case C-281/98, Angonese.
23ECJ 5 February 1963, Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos.
24ECJ 12 December 1974, Case C-36/1974, Walrave and Koch.
25Supra n. 21.
26Supra n. 22.
27ECJ 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold.
28ECJ 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci.
29ECJ 19 April 2016, Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri (DI).
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prohibition of discrimination as a general principle of EU law, now codiﬁed in
Article 21 of the Charter, has direct horizontal eﬀect in all ﬁelds covered by
EU law.30
T  :      
     G  
The revolutionary impact of Egenberger primarily concerns the cross-national
debate on the direct and indirect horizontal eﬀect of fundamental rights, with
particular regard to German law. The origins of this debate go back to the after-
math of World War II when new democratic constitutions were being enacted in
several continental European countries. In the late 1940s, the national courts of
various EU member states, including Italy and Germany, started applying new
constitutionally-protected fundamental rights and principles (such as the equality
principle) directly when adjudicating litigation that involved labour relation-
ships.31 In the 1970s, the Court of Justice also began to apply fundamental prin-
ciples enshrined in the Treaty, such as the prohibition of discrimination, directly
when adjudicating litigation that involved labour relationships.32 One could,
therefore, argue that a harmonious judicial dialogue,33 or at least a harmonious
judicial interaction, existed on this issue between the Court of Justice and the
national courts of the said member states through the end of the 1970s.34
This state of harmonywas partially interrupted in the 1980s by a change of prev-
alent opinion in Germany. In order to understand this change, one has to consider
the history of the German judicial dialogue on the horizontal eﬀect of fundamental
rights on labour relationships.35 In the early 1950s, Germany was one of the ﬁrst
30See Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 17, p. 207-208.
31See the judgments referred by Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 15, p. 113, fn. 56. On the direct and
indirect horizontal application of fundamental rights to the adjudication of private litigation in nine
European countries, see G. Brüggemeier et al. (eds.), Fundamental Rights and Private Law in the
European Union. Volume 1: A Comparative Overview (Cambridge University Press 2010).
32Walrave, supra n. 24; Defrenne, supra n. 21. See Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 15, p. 113-114. For
a relatively recent account of the horizontal eﬀect of EU fundamental rights, see M. Fornasier, ‘The
Impact of EU Fundamental Rights on Private Relationships: Direct or Indirect Eﬀect?’, 23 European
Review of Private Law (2015) p. 29.
33On judicial dialogue, see F. Cafaggi and S. Law, ‘Judicial dialogue in European private law:
introductory remarks’, in F. Cafaggi and S. Law (eds.), Judicial Cooperation in European Private
Law (Edward Elgar 2017) p. 1 ﬀ.
34This and the following paragraphs (i.e. the text between n. 29 and n. 44) constitute an updated
and shortened version of section IV (‘Angonese and the cross-national judicial dialogue on the hori-
zontal eﬀect of fundamental rights’) of A. Colombi Ciacchi, ‘European fundamental rights and pri-
vate litigations: judicial dialogue and judicial governance’, in Cafaggi and Law, supra n. 33, p. 208 ﬀ.
35Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 34, p. 216-218.
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Europeancountries to embrace thedoctrineof thedirect horizontal eﬀect, on labour
relationships, of fundamental rights and constitutional principles. This doctrinewas
mainly developed by Nipperdey, who, in addition to being a scholar,36 was also
President of the German Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) from 1954
until 1963. Not unrelatedly, the ﬁrst Bundesarbeitsgericht decision on the direct
horizontal eﬀect of fundamental rights was issued as early as 1954.37
However, in its famous Lüth decision of 1958,38 the German Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) did not followNipperdey’s doctrine.
Instead, it embracedthedoctrineof the indirecthorizontal eﬀectof fundamental rights
theorised byDürig, one of the leading commentators on theGermanConstitution.39
Since the Lüth case did not concern labour law, the Bundesarbeitsgericht continued to
apply the direct horizontal eﬀect doctrine to labour relationships through the 1980s.
The state of disharmony in the internalGerman judicial dialogue on this issue came to
anend in1985whentheBundesarbeitsgerichtaligned its jurisprudencewith that of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and deﬁnitively rejected the direct horizontal eﬀect doctrine
with respect to individual labour relationships.40Moreover, over the course of the last
30 years, the Bundesarbeitsgericht has increasingly established the indirect horizontal
eﬀect doctrine as far as collective labour agreements are concerned.41
The current German approach42 substantially converges with current opinion
prevalent in the UK, which also supports giving merely indirect horizontal eﬀect
36H.C. Nipperdey, ‘Gleicher Lohn der Frau für gleiche Arbeit’, Recht der Arbeit (1950) p. 121;
H.C. Nipperdey, in L. Enneccerus and H.C. Nipperdey, Allgemeiner Teil des Bürgerlichen Rechts,
14th edn (Mohr 1954); H.C. Nipperdey, ‘Die Würde des Menschen’, in K.A. Bettermann et al.
(eds.), Die Grundrechte. Handbuch der Theorie und Praxis der Grundrechte Vol. II: Die
Freiheitsrechte in Deutschland (Duncker & Humblot 1954) p. 111, 143; H.C. Nipperdey,
Grundrechte und Privatrecht (Scherpe 1961).
37BAG 3 December 1954, BAGE 1, 185; NJW 1955, 606. For a comment in English see
P. Beckmann et al., ‘Germany’, in Brüggemeier et al., supra n. 31, p. 253, 289-90.
38BVerfG 15 January 1958, BVerfGE 7, 198. For a commentary in English, see G. Brüggemeier,
‘Constitutionalisation of Private Law – The German Perspective’, in T. Barkhuysen and
S. Lindenbergh (eds), Constitutionalisation of Private Law (Brill/Nijhoﬀ 2006) p. 59 ﬀ.
39G. Dürig, ‘Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung’, in T. Maunz (ed.), Vom Bonner Grundgesetz
zur gesamtdeutschen Verfassung, Festschrift zum 75. Geburtstag vonHansNawiasky (Beck 1956) p. 176.
40BAG 27 February 1985, BAGE 48, 123. For an overview of the scholarly debate on the direct
and indirect horizontal eﬀect of fundamental rights in labour relationships between 1950 and 1985,
see D. Fabisch, Die unmittelbare Wirkung der Grundrechte im Arbeitsrecht (Peter Lang 2010) p. 223.
41BAG 25 February 1998, BAGE 88, 118, 123; BAG 18 March 2009, BAGE 130, 43. See the
comments to these judgments quoted in Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 34, p. 218.
42On the horizontal eﬀect of fundamental rights and freedoms in Germany, see D. Looschelders
and M. Makowsky, ‘The Inﬂuence of Human Rights and Basic Rights in German Private Law’, in
V. Trstenjak and P. Weingerl (eds.), The Inﬂuence of Human Rights and Basic Rights in Private Law
(Springer 2016) p. 295 ﬀ, with further references. See also the other works quoted in Colombi
Ciacchi, supra n. 34, p. 218.
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to fundamental human rights in contractual relationships.43 The German and UK
approaches do, however, clash with the position of courts and scholars prevalent
in other European countries such as Italy and France, where fundamental rights
are undoubtedly deemed to have direct horizontal eﬀect on labour relationships.44
As a result, Angonese, Mangold, Kücükdeveci, and now Egenberger and IR v JQ,
fully harmonise with the previous Court of Justice jurisprudence and Italian-
French case law while clashing with the current approach in Germany and
the UK.45
Although the judges who decided Angonese, Egenberger, and IR v JQ may have
been unaware of the conﬂict of views between the judiciaries of diﬀerent Member
States regarding the direct application of fundamental rights and freedoms to
labour relationships, the abovementioned decisions objectively represent, inde-
pendent of the judges’ subjective awareness, a strong voice in the supranational
and cross-national judicial dialogue on the horizontal eﬀect of fundamental rights,
freedoms, and constitutional principles.46 Those judgments arguably mark the
victory of the direct horizontal eﬀect doctrine in ﬁelds covered by EU law, at least
as far as labour relationships are concerned.47
For purposes of German law, Egenberger and IR v JQ could be seen as the
comeback of the direct horizontal eﬀect doctrine - a posthumous victory, so
to say, of Nipperdey over Dürig. Those two judgments constitute a double rev-
olution in the principles established by the German Federal Constitutional
Court: they contradict both its stance on the direct horizontal eﬀect of
fundamental rights and its case law on the autonomy of religious organisations
in employment matters. It remains to be seen whether the Federal
Constitutional Court will accept the Court of Justice’s approach,48 or whether
a new Solange-like saga will unfold.
43For a comparison of the German and English horizontal eﬀect approaches, see J.F. Krahé, ‘The
Impact of Public Law Norms on Private Law Relationships – Horizontal Eﬀect in German, English,
ECHR and EU Law’, 2 European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance (2015) p. 124 with
further references. See also the works quoted in Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 34, p. 218.
44C. Herrmann and C. Perfumi, ‘France’, in Brüggemeier et al., supra n. 31, p. 190, 206 ﬀ;
C. Mak et al., ‘Italy’, ibid., p. 325, 341.
45See Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 34, p. 219 and Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 17, p. 211.
46Ibid.
47Colombi Ciacchi, supra n. 17, p. 211.
48See P. Stein, ‘Der Fall Egenberger und das kirchliche Arbeitsrecht’, Humanistische Union,
22 November 2018, 〈www.humanistische-union.de/nc/aktuelles/aktuelles_detail/back/aktuelles/
article/der-fall-egenberger-und-das-kirchliche-arbeitsrecht/〉, visited 29 April 2019: the
Bundesverfassungsgericht will ultimately have to decide whether to accept the correction from
Luxembourg or, instead, to ﬁnd a violation of the identity of the German Constitution.
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C
The Egenberger and IR v JQ decisions are two wonderful pieces of EU
constitutional law. They contain several courageous statements that consolidate
and enhance the constitutionalisation of not only European private law49 but also
EU law in general.
On the one hand, these decisions have conﬁrmed and reinforced well-known
case law principles on the direct horizontal eﬀect of the prohibition of discrimi-
nation in labour relationships which have evolved in a coherent line that started
with Defrenne and continued on through Mangold, Kücükdeveci, and DI. On the
other hand, however, Egenberger and IR v JQ went beyond those rulings in at least
three regards. First, they clearly acknowledged the direct horizontal eﬀect of at
least certain Charter rights. Second, Egenberger ‘unequivocally proclaims
Article 47 of the Charter on eﬀective judicial protection as a fully-ﬂedged right’50
with direct eﬀect in the adjudication of private litigation. Third, Egenberger
clariﬁed the compatibility of the direct (horizontal) eﬀect of Articles 21 and
47 of the Charter with the obligation of national courts to balance competing
fundamental rights.
Ultimately, although Egenberger and IR v JQ have limited the autonomy of
religious organisations to some extent, they did not interfere with the freedom
of national courts to balance competing fundamental rights according to national
constitutional values. As Frantziou correctly noted, Egenberger ‘oﬀers a method-
ology for assessing the application of fundamental rights in disputes between
private parties that is capable of reconciling the eﬀectiveness of EU law with
national constitutional structures. It ( : : : ) marks a more discursive form of
constitutional reasoning than the Court has previously used in this ﬁeld’.51
49On this phenomenon, see the collection of essays in Micklitz, supra n. 15.
50Lourenço, supra n. 9, p. 200.
51Frantziou, supra n. 17.
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